The disciples and pseudo-followers of the religious ideologues Sayyid Qutb and Rabbi Zvi Yehudah Kook have now lived without their mentors for more than twentyfive years (in the case of Qutb) and for more than a decade (in the case of Kook). In both instances, putative "disciples" of these thinkers committed assassinations of the acknowledged domestic leader of a sitting goverment: Sadat in 1981 by al-Jihad al-Islami; Rabin in 1995 by Eyal. In this paper, the theories of both mentors and their ersatz disciples on the issue of violence against the sitting government will be examined for possible comparative results. Rather than finding a symmetry in these examples of Middle Eastern fundamentalist violence, the author elaborates a sharp difference between the two: one (Islam) is centered on the issue of apostasy, while the other (Judaism) is centered on the issue of communal rights and protections. Rather than providing a point for drawing similarities, fundamentalist-inspired assassination points out the differences between Israeli-Jewish and Egyptian-Islamic fundamentalisms.
By the time a post-scriptural tradition crystallizes, Rabbinic Judaism has abandoned the notion of licit murder for doctrinal grounds while still maintaining a mechanism for licit murder. The principle is neatly summed up by four words in the Babylonian Talmudba' le-hargekha, hashkem le-hargo-"If someone comes to kill yourise up to kill him."8 Alternatively, Islam, because of its imperial and universal political scope, was able to establish a doctrinal threshold for inflicting capital punishment. The murtadd, or "apostate," is a Muslim, whether by birth or conversion, who abandons Islam either for authorized religions, or for heresy, or for idolatry. According to the shari'ah, the apostate is to be given a 3-day opportunity to recant, and if that fails to bring the expected result, he is to be executed. While it is nowhere explicitly stated in the Qur'an that execution is the appropriate punishment for apostasy, it is the case that Sura 2: 217: wa-man yartadid minkum 'an dinihi fa-yamut wa-huwa kafir... "Whoever among you apostatizes from his religion and dies an infidel..." is regarded as prooftext enough. 9 It is in this legalistic context that Sadat's assassins explicate their action. In a work which cites most liberally from the strict 14th century Islamic jurist Ibn Taymiyah, the Faridah al-Gha'ibah declares:
The rulers of this age are in apostasy from Islam (hukkdm al-muslimn fi riddah 'ani-'l-isldm). They were raised at the tables of imperialism, be it Crusaderism or Communism, or Zionism. They carry nothing from Islam but their names, even though they pray and fast and claim to be Muslim... an apostate has to be killed. 10 In this instance, the author of the Faridah declares in religiolegalistic fashion that the legal schools of Malikis, Shafi'is, and Hanbalis are all in agreement that an apostate must be killed. The form of the apostasy is Westernism, or "Crusaderism," and the rightful punishment is death.
When we look to the assassination of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, we discover a very different order of argumentation invoked in justification of the assassination. The issue is not apostasy, or some doctrinal deviation. Indeed, in the classic codes going back to medieval times, and across the cultural divide of Islam and Christendom, there is in Jewish law no comparable assault on the life and limb of the apostate." Thus, the issue here is cast in a somewhat more interpersonal-or at least communal-texture, as it involves the legal ruling concerning the moser, the one who hands over a Jew to be Still, the seeds for action were present in the Kookist world view. As one reads Kook's venomous contempt for the first Rabin government, a portrait emerges which is no less radical than that of the Faridah: "If there is any coercion on the part of anyone to negate the sovereignty of our state from [Judea and Samaria], are we all not then religiously obligated to rise in insurrection and offer up our lives for such a cause?" '5 What I am more interested in is to draw whatever comparisons one might make between these two extreme acts of moder political violence. Do they indicate a symmetry between the fundamentalist movements in each state? And, since they both seem to be targeting policy makers who are pursuing peace of one kind or another, are the motivations for each group the same? We've certainly heard enough punditry to that effect. I argue differently:
In these acts, and in the swirl of authentic literature or evidence that they have generated, it becomes clear that these are two very different fundamentalisms, despite our incessant efforts to draw them together. One is a fundamentalism of an imperial, global, and universal religion-or at least with aspirations to such. Accordingly, Qutb taught that concerning these ignoramuses, it was a duty and an obligation of every Muslim to strive or struggle against them. Qutb declared jihad against the Egyptian government and the politicians who pretend to be good Muslims, but who are allowing alcohol into restaurants, sexy movies into the cinema, and Western licentiousness into public life. The reigning leaders and policy makers are poisoned with an overarching vileness, "Westerism" which is jahiliyyah, the very same ignorance of the godless, compassless era before Islam was delivered to mankind. These politicians may be willing to compromise with Israel or they may not; it does not matter-these politicians must be opposed, and opposed violently, and their world-wide allies must be opposed, until they are gone. In response to such abstract and abiding Ignorance, one might simply declare it apostasy and flee from it (takfir wa-hijrah). Better yet, one must struggle against it (jihdd).22
In the more constrained world of Rabbi Zvi Yehudah Kook, the focus of opposition is not a broad cultural construct such as "the West" or even 
